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NOTES
Not-So-Critical Vendors: Redefining

Critical Vendor Orders
BY CHRISTOPHER

D. HUNT*

INTRODUCTION

S

everal recent cases, typified by In re Kmart Corp.' and In re

CoServ, L.L. C.,2 have significantly curtailed a debtor's ability to
pay the pre-petition debts of certain vendors that the debtor believes are
"critical" to the continued operation of his business while in a chapter 11
reorganization.3 These rulings are reactions to the current state of affairs
regarding first-day orders4 in a bankruptcy petition, namely courts'
routine approval of a debtor's list of critical vendors with little or no
scrutiny.5 This note will briefly lay out the history of critical vendor
* J.D. expected 2006, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1992, University of Kentucky.
The author would like to thank Professor Christopher Frost for his suggestion of this
topic and invaluable assistance in writing this note. The author would also like to thank
his wife, Mary Ellen Hunt. Without her love and support, the author would not be
attending law school. Finally, the author thanks his parents, Eugene and Dorothy Hunt,
and his brother Timothy for their support and encouragement. All of them knew the law
was his first, best choice before he did.
1In re Krnart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004).
2Inre CoServ, L.L.C., 273 BR. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
' 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2004).
4See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery,
330 F.3d 548, 574 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that "first-day" orders involve a debtor
asking the court to approve urgent matters affecting the ongoing viability of the business,
including "key-employee retention plans, the payment of pre-petition claims of critical
vendors, and, most important, going-forward financing"). For an additional general
discussion of what issues most first-day orders address, see John D. Ayer et al., What
Every Unsecured Creditor Should Know About Chapter 11, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16
(2004), and John D. Penn, FirstDays/Crazy Days or, "There's Mischief in Them Thar'
Motions ", 19 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30 (2000).
5 See, e.g., In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 868. ("Bankruptcy Judge Sonderby entered a
critical-vendors order . . .without receiving any pertinent evidence . . . and without
making any finding of fact that the disfavored creditors would gain or come out even.");
Patricia L. Barsalou & Zack Mosner, Preferential First-Day Orders: Same Question,
Different Look, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, 8 (2003) (stating that "[s]ometimes the only
judicial restriction is a monetary cap on the total amount paid to all critical vendors");
Joseph Gilday, "Critical" Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate the
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orders, examine the major problems with those orders, and explore some
possible solutions. It will be argued that critical vendor orders are
unnecessary and, by setting a priority list for paying creditors, violate a
basic element of the Bankruptcy Code that provides stability and

predictability. 6 Such orders elevate certain creditors above higher priority
ones with little justification.
I. OVERVIEW OF CRITICAL VENDOR ORDERS

A. Definition andRationale

A critical vendor order is typically included among the flurry of
first-day motions that accompany the filing of a bankruptcy petition.7
These orders allow some vendors, who are usually unsecured creditors,
to move to the front of the line, trumping even secured creditors.8 This

priority status allows them to receive payment for pre-petition debts. The
debtor-in-possession ("DIP") argues that these vendors supply goods or
services that are essential to the continued operation of his business and
that those vendors will refuse to make future shipments or to continue

furnishing services if the pre-petition debts are not paid. 9
The underlying rationale for granting such orders is that, by helping
a business reorganize and become profitable again, even those creditors

deemed "not critical" ultimately benefit because the business will be in a
better position to pay those debts after reorganization.' 0 Debtors often
support their motions by citing several specific sections of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 411, 4i9 (2003) (stating that "critical
vendor" motions are often granted after quickly scheduled hearings and with little
representation from other creditors).
6 1I U.S.C. § 507.
7 See Ayer et. al., supra note 4, at 16; Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, The
Doctrine of Necessity and Critical Trade Vendors: The Impracticality of Maintaining
Post-PetitionBusiness Relations in Mega-Cases, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24 (2002)
("When a corporate debtor files its chapter 11 petition, it usually includes a barrage of
emergency 'first-day motions."').
8 See Gilday, supra note 5, at 414.
9 See White & Medford, supra note 7, at 24. See also Gilday, supra note 5, at 41516 ("Debtor's counsel usually claims that losing [critical vendor services] would have...
a 'severely pernicious effect on [its] efforts to rehabilitate and reorganize."'); Bruce S.
Nathan, Critical Vendors: Elevating the Low-Priority Unsecured Claims of Pre-Petition
Trade Creditors, 21 AM. BANKRd. INST. J. 14, 14 (2002) (stating that payment for prepetition debts is often exchanged for the supplier's assurance it will continue to ship
merchandise at pre-chapter II credit terms).
10See In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 872 ("If paying the critical vendors would enable a
successful reorganization and make even the disfavored creditors better off, then all
creditors favor payment whether or not they are designated as 'critical."').
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Bankruptcy Code ("Code")11 and the common-law Doctrine of
Necessity; 12 however, the most common tactic is to rely on § 105(a) of
the Code:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No
provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in
interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking
any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of
process. 13

To bolster their motions for critical vendor orders under § 105(a),
petitioners can rely on a doctrine that is not included in the Code-the
Doctrine of Necessity.
B. The Doctrine ofNecessity
Rooted in common law, the Doctrine of Necessity has not been
clearly defined and has no explicit basis in the Code. 14 Furthermore, no
court has yet clarified under what circumstances the doctrine is to be
employed. 15 In the absence of more explicit guidance, § 105(a) of the
current Code 16is used as the jumping off point to apply the doctrine in
modem cases.
A version of the Doctrine of Necessity was initially used in railroad
cases of the 19th Century. It derived from the "Necessity of Payment
Rule," which was first adopted by the Supreme Court in Miltenberger v.
Logansport.17 Although the doctrines are distinct, the rationale for both is

1 Some of the sections typically relied upon include § 363(b) (granting trustee
power to use, sell, or lease property of the estate other than in the ordinary course of
business), § 364(b) (allowing court to authorize trustee to obtain unsecured credit or incur
unsecured debt), and § 503 (allowance of administrative expenses). See Gilday, supra
note 5, at 423-26. This note will address these sections of the code and their use in firstday motions
in more detail in Parts II through IV.
12
See infra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
1 ll U.S.C. § 105(a) (2004).
14 Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its
Parameters,73 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 1 (1989).
15Id. Although no court has yet defined the Doctrine of Necessity, Eisenberg and
Gecker characterize it as "a principle used in bankruptcy law which permits the use of
certain provisions of the Code or common law ostensibly in contradiction to other law in
order to accomplish a vital objective in a bankruptcy case." Id. at 2.
16See id

17See Miltenberger v. Logansport, C. & S.W.R. Co., 106 U.S. 286, 311 (1882). The
Miltenberger Court cautioned restraint in the use of the Necessity of Payment Rule and
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the same, as both rely on the argument that favoring some creditors can
ultimately benefit all creditors. 18 While the Doctrine of Necessity stems
from the Necessity of Payment Rule, the latter only applies to "railroad
reorganizations and not to businesses generally."' 19 A related rule, also
unique to railroad bankruptcies,20 is the Six Months Rule, codified in
§ 1171 (b) of the Code. 21 This rule "permits claims for services and goods
supplied to a railroad six months 22before filing to be paid as
administrative expense priority claims."
The application of the Doctrine of Necessity, typically used in
conjunction with § 105(a), is best illustrated by In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Inc.23 Ionosphere involved the bankruptcy of Eastern Air Lines, during
which striking employees sought to have their pre-petition wages,
salaries, and medical benefits paid, just as Eastern had done for its active
workers.24 The court denied the request, relying in large measure on the
application of the railroad doctrine and a broad interpretation of § 105(a)
and § 363(b)(1), although it did use the Doctrine of Necessity to uphold
payment to the active employees. 2 The Ionosphere court justified the use
of the doctrine by citing Dudley v. Mealey,26 stating:
Even if this case is not directly covered by the Railway Labor Act,
the doctrine would still be applicable under the rationale of Judge
Learned Hand who applied this rule to a non-railroad debtor in Dudley
v. Mealey .... In that case, Judge Learned Hand held that a court was

stated the rule in these terms: "Many circumstances may exist which may make it
necessary and indispensable to the business of the road and the preservation of the
property, for the receiver to pay preexisting debts of certain classes, out of the earnings of
the receivership, or even the corpus of the property, under the order of the court, with a
priority of lien. Yet the discretion to do so should be exercised with very great care." Id.
18Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 14, at 3.
9
1d. at 3-4.
2
old. at4.
21 11 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (2004).
22 Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 14, at 3-4.
23 In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). For
additional cases showing application of this Doctrine, see also In re Just for Feet, 242
B.R. 821, 826 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (holding that to invoke the necessity of payment
doctrine through 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), debtor must show payment of pre-petition claims
critical to its survival) and In re Eagle-PicherIndustries, Inc., 124 B.R. 1021, 1023
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that a bankruptcy court may exercise its powers under
§ 105(a) "to authorize payment of pre-petition claims where such payment is necessary to
'permit the greatest likelihood of survival of the debtor and payment of creditors in full or
al [sic] least proportionately').
24 See In re Ionosphere, 98 B.R. at 175.
25
Id. at 175, 177.
26 Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1945).

2004-2005]

NOT-SO-CRITICAL VENDORS

not "helpless" to apply the rule to non-railroad debtors where the
alternative was a cessation of operations.27

In sum, courts have, in some cases, allowed debtors to successfully

argue that a limited doctrine meant only to be applied in railroad cases,
and one that runs contrary to the tenets of the non-railroad sections of
the Code, should allow them to violate both the letter and the spirit of the

Code. While at times there may be valid reasons for departing from the
Code, the next section illustrates why courts should resist this temptation.
II. CRITIQUING CRITICAL VENDOR ORDERS
A.

Recent Cases

Within the past few years, critical vendor orders have come under
increasing scrutiny by both courts and legal scholars. 28 This section

explores the issues raised by two of the more prominent cases: In re

Kmart Corp.29 and In re CoServ, L.L. C.30 Some commentators usefully

summarize the current legal status of critical vendor orders in federal
courts in the following manner: "(1) The Seventh Circuit has limited the
critical vendor doctrine; (2) the Ninth, Fifth and Fourth Circuits have rejected the doctrine; and (3) the Third Circuit has consistently recognized
the doctrine."31 This Circuit split emphasizes the current uncertainty surrounding the critical vendor doctrine.

1. In re Kmart
Kmart, in its petition for bankruptcy, asked for and was granted
permission to pay approximately $300 million in pre-petition debts to
27
28

In re Ionosphere, 98 B.R. at 176.
See generally In re CEI Roofing, Inc., 315 B.R. 50, 55 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004)

(noting that the 5th Circuit has held that use of § 105(a) to justify use of the Doctrine of
Necessity represents overreaching not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code); In re
Chandlier, 292 B.R. 583, 588 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2003) (stating flatly in dicta that the
Doctrine of Necessity is "itself a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 507 and in fact, is not
authorized by any Bankruptcy Code section"); Jo Ann J. Brighton, The Doctrine of
Necessity: Is It Really Necessary?, 10 J. BANK.R. L. & PRAC. 107, 116 (2000) (arguing for
very limited application of the Doctrine of Necessity absent congressional authorization);
Gilday, supra note 5, at 414 (observing that the Doctrine of Necessity is controversial and
not explicitly authorized by the Bankruptcy Code).
29 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004).
30
In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
31 James H.M. Sprayregen et al., Down, but Not Out: The Status of Critical-Vendor
Payments Post-Kmart,23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 26 (2004).
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2330 suppliers.32 The money to pay these creditors came from $2 billion
in DIP financing authorized by the bankruptcy court.33 Capital Factors,
Inc., one of the 43,000 unsecured creditors that had been deemed "not
critical," immediately challenged the critical vendors order, which
moved the issue from bankruptcy court to the Seventh Circuit's general
jurisdiction courts.34
In his opinion, Judge Easterbrook devoted little discussion to the
Seventh Circuit's core objection to granting the order: "The bankruptcy
court's [overturned] order declared that the relief Kmart requestedopen-ended permission to pay any debt to any vendor it deemed
'critical' in the exercise of unilateral discretion . . . was 'in the best

interests of the Debtors, their estates and their creditors.' 35 Focus on the
scrutiny given to determining those vendors that are critical to the
reorganizing business is the theme of the Seventh Circuit's stricter
standard for granting such orders.
The appellants, who at first benefited from the critical vendor order
but were stripped of that benefit by the district court judge, argued on
appeal that the Doctrine of Necessity, as authorized by § 105, § 363(b),
§ 364(b), and § 503 of the Code, allowed them to receive preferential
treatment contrary to § 507's priority scheme.36 The Kmart court quickly
dispensed with the Doctrine and the use of § 105 as support, holding that
this section of the Code "does not create discretion to set aside the
Code's rules about priority and distribution; the power conferred by
§ 105(a) is one to implement rather than override., 37 The court also
dismissed the Doctrine of Necessity itself, calling it "just a fancy name
for a power to depart from the Code., 38 Finally, precedent cited by Judge
Easterbrook noted that § 105 has been interpreted by all of the circuits to
require that all unsecured
creditors be paid in full if even one unsecured
39
creditor is paid in full.
32 In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 869. An example of a vendor receiving payment as a

result of the critical vendor order was a "food and consumer products supplier to
Kmart[,]" The Fleming Companies, to which the bankruptcy court approved a $76
million payment. Kmart Shipments Resumed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at C15.

Ironically, Kmart would later end the contract with Fleming and thus contribute to
Fleming's petition for bankruptcy, since the retailer was Fleming's largest customer.
FlemingReceives Bankruptcy Court Approval ofLoan, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2003, at C4.
"
In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 869.
34

Id. at 869.

35 Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
16 See id. at 872.
7 id. at 871.
38 Id.
39

Id. at 871.
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Appellants next argued that § 364(b) ° and § 503,41 taken together,
authorize favoring payment of some creditors over others.42 These
sections, the court noted, authorize a debtor to obtain post-petition credit
to run the business (through § 364) and to pay administrative expenses
(§ 503), but they do not allow a debtor to elevate certain creditors to
favored status.43 To allow such debts to be classified as administrative
expenses, the court reasoned, would mean pre-petition debts could
continue to plague a business's attempts to reorganize and become
profitable. 4
Lastly, the court addressed the appellant's reliance on § 363(b)(1),
which states: "The trustee [or DIP], after notice and a hearing, may use,
sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of
the estate. ' 5 The court considered this section to be the most promising
argument for granting the critical vendor order, reasoning that payment
of pre-petition debts "critical" to continuing the business was outside the
ordinary course of business.4 6 The court's definition of "business" is
crucial, as it focused on administering the estate under the specialized
rules of the Bankruptcy Code, not the buying and selling of merchandise
on the open market (the business in which Kmart engages). 7
In upholding the district court's denial of the critical vendor orders,
the Seventh Circuit noted several alternatives for dealing with creditors
owed pre-petition debts.48 First, Kmart could simply pay for deliveries as
they are received, on a C.O.D. basis or similar arrangement.4 9 Judge
Easterbrook supported this option by reasoning that while "[i]t... may
be vital to assure [suppliers] that a debtor will pay for new deliveries on a
current basis

. . .

that assurance need not, however, entail payment for

40 "The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to obtain
unsecured credit or to incur unsecured debt other than under subsection (a) of this

section, allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense." 11
U.S.C. § 364(b) (2004).
41"After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses, other
than claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title, including-(1)(A) the actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or

commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)-(b)(1)(A).
42 See In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 872.
41 See id.
4" See id.

41 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1).
4In
re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 872.
47 See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of
"ordinary course of business" as used in § 363(b)(1)).
48 See In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 873.
49Id.
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pre-petition transactions."'0 Second, Judge Easterbrook noted that Kmart
could use the $2 billion line of credit it secured after filing its petition as
an assurance to vendors that payment for future shipments would be
forthcoming.5' The court suggested the use of a "siandby letter of credit
on which the bankruptcy judge could authorize unpaid vendors to draw"
to accomplish this assurance function.52 Judge Easterbrook went on to
note that "[i]f lenders are unwilling to issue such a letter of credit (or if
they insist on a letter's short duration)," it is likely a signal that the
debtor's prospects for effective reorganization are poor and that
liquidation is therefore imminent.5 3 Finally, the court intimated that
vendors, while positioning themselves as "critical" through threats of
refusing to ship goods, are likely to continue doing business with debtors
like Kmart even if they do not receive payment for pre-petition debts.54
This conclusion rests on the logic that those vendors need to do business
with Kmart almost as much as Kmart needs to do business with them,
and it would be foolish to turn down a sale.55
2. In re CoServ
CoServ, at the time of filing its petition, consisted of six debtors, all
communications businesses.56 The debtors sought a critical vendor order
that would allow them to pay twenty-seven creditors approximately $2.2
million in pre-petition debts.57 After review by the judge, CoServ modified its request to include seven creditors and approximately $500,000
in payments.5 "
After discussing the history of the Necessity of Payment Rule and
the Doctrine of Necessity, the court addressed § 549 and § 363(b)(1) of
the Code. CoServ argued that these sections permit unequal treatment of
creditors.59 The court dismissed these arguments with little explanation,
50

ld.

51Id. See generally, Bruce A. Henoch, Comment, Post-PetitionFinancing:Is There
Life After Debt?, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 575 (1991) (discussing in detail a variety of postpetition financing arrangements).
52 In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 873.
53
id.
54

Id. at 873-74.

55 Id. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Easterbrook stated that a vendor would be
unlikely to pass up profit available on each new delivery simply because of the old debts.

He deemed such an action "a self-inflicted wound" predicting that "[f]irms that disdain
current profits because of old losses are unlikely to stay in business." Id. at 873.
56 In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 489 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
57
ld. at 490.
58
1d.
59

Id. at 492-93.

2004-20051

NOT-SO--CRITICAL VENDORS

concluding: "Only [§] 105(a) offers the equitable muscle that would
allow a bankruptcy court to violate one of the principal tenets of Chapter
11: that pre-petition general unsecured claims should be satisfied on an
equal basis pursuant to a plan."60
Noting that the court's powers of equity under § 105(a) are "severely
circumscribed," 61 Judge Lynn developed a three-prong test for approving
payment of pre-petition general unsecured claims:
First, it must be critical that the debtor deal with the claimant.
Second, unless it deals with the claimant, the debtor risks the
probability of harm, or, alternatively, loss of economic advantage to the
estate or the debtor's going concern value, which is disproportionate to
the amount of the claimant's pre-petition claim. Third, there is no
practical or legal alternative by which the 62debtor can deal with the
claimant other than by payment of the claim.

To satisfy the first prong, the vendor or vendors in question must be
"virtually indispensable to profitable operations or preservation of the
estate.'63 A clear example is a vendor that is the sole supplier of a crucial
product. 64 Paying a fee substantially less than the value of estate property
in order to regain possession of that property from the claimant
represents a situation that meets the court's second prong,65 as it would
be in keeping with a trustee's or DIP's fiduciary duty to maximize the
value of the estate for creditors. The third prong would seem to be the
most difficult to meet, as there are many alternatives to immediate, full
payment of pre-petition debts; deposits, cash-on-delivery, letters of
credit, and consignment are just a few.6 6
Throughout its decision, the court viewed the allowance of critical
vendor orders as an extraordinary step, requiring reliance on "catchall"
sections like § 105(a):
In summary, even a cursory review of the law makes clear that this
Court does not possess the broad powers advocated by Debtors for
approving payment of prepetition claims. The question for the Court,
60

ld.at 493.

61 id

62

Id.at 498.

63

id.

64 id.

Id. This example is the inverse of one offered on this prong by the court: "It is
obviously a bad bargain to pay $100,000 to recover $10,000 of estate property of which a
claimant has possession." Id.
66 See id. at 494. See generally, Henoch, supra note 51 (discussing details
of postpetition financing under the Code).
65
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then, is whether, in this circuit, a bankruptcy court
67 may ever authorize
payment of general unsecured prepetition claims.
In the court's opinion, the "bridge" between § 105 and the Doctrine
of Necessity was rooted in the DIP's (or trustee's) fiduciary duty to
operate the business for the benefit of all the estate's creditors. 68 The
court answered its question with a "yes"-critical vendor orders may be
approved so long as the three-prong test is satisfied. As the next section
demonstrates, however, there are problems with critical vendor orders
that are beyond statutory interpretation.
B. Problems with CriticalVendor Orders
In addition to the code-specific problems with critical vendor orders,
there are several more practical complications to applying equity-based
rules such as the Doctrine of Necessity. First, evaluating which vendors
are critical becomes increasingly difficult in "mega cases" like Kmart
where there are thousands of vendors to consider. It is difficult, at best,
for a bankruptcy judge to review the often quite intricate financial
information of those thousands of vendors in an attempt to determine if a
debtor identified vendors that are actually "critical" to the continued
operation of the business. 69 The evidentiary and procedural requirements
for such an examination would be burdensome and would likely recreate
in general, and the
the scramble to collect from the debtor that the Code
70
automatic stay in particular, was designed to stop.
Second, when the time does come to face financial reality, matters
are hectic. Creditors have likely given ultimatums in the form of notices
that they will no longer ship supplies or provide services unless debts are
paid. 7' This circumstance begs the question: are certain vendors critical
because the business cannot operate without the product or service
provided by that particular vendor, or has the debtor failed to line up an
alternative vendor that can enable his business to continue? 72 This type of
67 In re CoServ, 273

B.R. at 496.
68 See id. at 496-97.
69 Cf Gilday, supra note 5, at 419 (noting that "[g]enerally courts approving a
critical vendor motion leave it to the debtor to decide which of its aggressive vendors are
important enough to justify payment").
70 The automatic stay takes effect when a petition in bankruptcy is filed and stops all
attemts to collect from the debtor. See II U.S.C. § 362 (2004).
See Gilday, supra note 5, at 415.
72 Concern over this question is evident, to an extent, in the three-prong test
enunciated by the CoServ court, stating that "it [is] critical that the debtor deal with the
claimant." In re CoServ, 273 B.R. at 498.
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situation, where time could be a significant factor, makes it even more
difficult for judges diligently to evaluate the evidence before them to
determine properly the importance of a particular vendor. To make
matters even more pressing, the judge's decision can have implications
beyond the beginning of a bankruptcy case and the period of a
company's reorganization:
First-day issues now include "interim" rulings that can effectively
become final and determinative of key parts of the case. How egregious
the "first-day goodie grab" becomes can be the difference between a
company's life and death. Knowing this, the parties with first-day
issues sometimes reach for too much at the outset, either hastening the
demise of a reorganizable business or loading on so much
administrative expense that no company could emerge from chapter
i11.73

Third, there is the question of who is being represented by business
managers-shareholders of the debtor corporation or creditors? Courts
are in a unique position to protect shareholders' interests against those
who may favor business relationships with certain vendors over
financially prudent steps that would reduce a business' pre-petition
debts.74 Another wrinkle is the argument that vendors, acting prudently,
would not turn down present and future profits simply out of displeasure
at not receiving timely, complete payment of pre-petition debts.75 With
this in mind, managers of debtor corporations should be encouraged to
define narrowly critical vendors and seek alternative suppliers in those
cases in which a vendor with a pre-petition claim refuses to do business
with the debtor.
Finally, vendors that are deemed "not critical" by the debtor are
rarely, if ever, informed that such orders are being considered by the
court.76 This raises questions about whether a judge can be expected to
fully evaluate the critical vendor motion without hearing from those
adversely affected by it.77 Questions regarding whether rules of civil

73Penn, supra note 4, at 30.
74 Scott Blakeley, Playing "Catch Up " with Pre-PetitionClaims Can Be Costly
for

Vendor, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24 (1999) (exploring the pitfalls of a vendor
attempting to recoup pre-petition losses in the context of Centennial Textiles, Inc., 227
B.R. 606 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
71 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 873 (7th Cir. 2004); Gilday, supra note 5, at
420.
76

See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 14, at 25-26; Gilday, supra note 5, at 415.

77 See Gilday, supra note 5, at 448.
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procedure are violated by not serving notice on those affected by the
decision also arise in this context.78
III. SOLUTIONS
A. Eliminate the Doctrine
Critical vendor orders trace their lineage directly from the Necessity
of Payment Rule, which was created over a hundred years ago
specifically for railroad bankruptcies.7 9 Over the past century, Congress
has chosen not to extend the specific provisions of that doctrine beyond
the section of the Code covering railroad petitions:
The legislative history of section 105(a) is not illuminating as to
the limits of the court's equitable power. The section's drafters were
primarily concerned with establishing the independence of the newly
restructured bankruptcy court system. There is no mention of critical
in opposition to the payment
vendors, or the ability of courts to act
80
priority scheme elsewhere in the Code.
To apply this concept, which violates the Code's goal of treating all
and courts have resorted to
similarly situated creditors alike,8' 8 debtors
2
strained interpretations of the Code.
While most debtors filing bankruptcy certainly find themselves in
dire straits, the Code provides them with ample protection from creditors
and with many additional tools to remedy their financial problems. For
example, a debtor may obtain an automatic stay to prevent creditors from
pursuing collection against the debtor,83 or the debtor may invoke various
78See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 14, at 24.
79See discussion supra Part I.

80 Gilday, supra note 5, at 431-32.
"l See II U.S.C. § 507 (2004). Section 507 sets out the priority by which nine
categories of claims and expenses are paid: 1) "administrative expenses"; 2) "unsecured
claims allowed under section 502(f)"; 3) "allowed unsecured claims," including "wages,
salaries, or commissions"; 4) "unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit
plan"; 5) claims by persons "engaged in the production or raising of grain" or "engaged
as a United States fisherman"; 6) "allowed unsecured claims of individuals"; 7) "claims
for debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor"; 8) "unsecured claims of
governmental units" such as taxes; and 9) "allowed unsecured claims based upon any
commitment by the debtor to a Federal depository institution's regulatory agency ...
Id.
82 See, for example, the discussion of In re Kmart and In re CoServ, supra Part II.
The Code sections commonly relied upon by debtors to reach the desired result are: 11
U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 363(b)(1), 364(b), 503, 549 (2004).
83 See generally § 362 (detailing which activities are stayed upon the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy).
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"avoiding powers" to cancel or rework contracts and recover some prepetition payments.84 Furthermore, debtors have knowledge that
bankruptcy will be filed, and therefore are able to plan for post-petition
financing. In exchange for these advantages, or perhaps to compensate
creditors likely to receive partial or no payment on debts owed them, the
Code provides some order and predictability via its priority list of
creditors. 86 Critical vendor orders ignore these provisions87 and introduce
an element of uncertainty for creditors and debtors which the Code was
crafted to eliminate.
It comes as no surprise that § 105(a) is the most commonly cited
supporting reference for critical vendor orders because it provides judges
with powerful and broadly defined authority.8 8 However, this is precisely
why § 105(a) should not be used to allow debtors and select creditors to
ignore the equitable measures set forth by the Code. As Judge
Easterbrook persuasively argued, § 105(a) was inserted to facilitate application of the Code's provisions, not to allow interested parties to
circumvent express proscriptions of acceptable conduct.89 Perhaps the
most convincing argument against the use of § 105(a) as the basis for
critical vendor orders is the section's language itself,90 which states:
"[t]he court may issue any order... necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this title."9' Since critical vendor orders, or anything

resembling such orders, are decidedly contrary to relevant sections of the
Code, such as § 507's priority scheme, it would be nonsensical to suggest
this phrase was intended to be anything other than an admonishment to
adhere to the Code's specifics.
Of all the sections used by debtors to justify a critical vendor order,
Judge Easterbrook highlighted § 363(b)(1) as the best candidate.92 That
section allows a trustee (or DIP) to "use, sell, or lease, other than in the
ordinary course of business, property of the estate. 93 Judge Easterbrook

84 A number of Code sections grant avoiding powers to various entities. See, e.g.,
§§ 544-548 (covering a variety of avoiding powers granted to the trustee to preserve the

estate).
85 Post-petition financing must be obtained in accordance with § 364.
86 See supra note 81 (summarizing the Code's priority provision at § 507).
87 See Gilday, supra note 5, at 414.
88 See discussion supra Part IV.A, Part I.B.
89 See supra Part II.A. 1; supra note 37 and accompanying text.

90 Thomas G. Kelch presents an analysis of a "plain meaning" approach to reading
the Code that is pertinent to this argument. See Thomas G. Kelch, An Apology for PlainMeaningInterpretationof the Bankruptcy Code, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 289 (1994).
91 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (emphasis added).
92 See In re Kmart, 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004).
9' 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1).
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reasoned that the "ordinary course of business" referred
9 4 to was that of a
trustee or DIP managing an estate while in bankruptcy.
However, this approach necessarily adopts a meaning of "ordinary
course of business" different than that used in other sections of the Code.
The phrase typically is used as a measuring stick for what is normally
done in the non-bankruptcy business world of the debtor. Judge
Easterbrook's version would, of course, be necessary to permit critical
vendor orders. Only then would the Code allow the debtor to bar
creditors from pursuing collection of debts and allow the debtor
unfettered discretion to cherry-pick the creditors it wishes to pay in full,
leaving the others with either no hope of payment or a mere fraction of
the debt owed them.
The key problem with Easterbrook's version of "ordinary course of
business" is that it begs the question: what exactly is the ordinary course
of business for a bankruptcy trustee or DIP? Nowhere in the Code is
there a definition of this phrase. Even § 323, entitled "Role and capacity
of trustee," offers no help in answering this question. 95 In order to make
§ 363(b)(1) conform to Judge Easterbrook's interpretation, a trustee's
tools must be defined by the trustee or judge through case law and
practice. This approach would eliminate the need for numerous sections
of the Code, as any specific grants or restrictions upon trustee power
could be swept aside by defining "ordinary course of business" either
narrowly or broadly.
The best answer to the question of what the ordinary course of
business is for a bankruptcy trustee or DIP is also the one that undercuts
§ 363(b)(1) as supporting critical vendor orders: the Code specifically
defines a trustee's duties and powers, yet one of the major tenets of the
Code is that creditors should be treated similarly. 96 Under this view,
"ordinary course of business" would take the same meaning in this
situation as in all other sections of the Code: a company operating in the
marketplace just as it would absent a bankruptcy petition, not a trustee or
DIP running a business in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, all is not lost should
critical vendor orders be eliminated.97 The remainder of this section

94 See In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 872 (stating that "satisfaction of a pre-petition debt

in order to keep 'critical' supplies flowing is a use of property other than in the ordinary
course of administering an estate in bankruptcy").
" 11 U.S.C. § 323 provides: "(a) The trustee in a case under this title is the
representative of the estate. (b) The trustee in a case under this title has capacity to sue
and be sued." ld.
96 See, e.g., § 507.
97 Some other concepts that may be related in narrow or limited circumstances are
those of setoff and recoupment. See generally Drew S. Norton, Recoupment: From Last
in Line to Firstin Line, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32 (1997).
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outlines ways in which a debtor may address unsecured creditors without
resorting to critical vendor orders.
B. Increase Use of Post-PetitionSecurity Interest

Section 364 of the Code provides the mechanism by which a debtor
may secure post-petition financing to carry out a reorganization plan. 98
Section 364(a) permits a debtor to first attempt to obtain unsecured credit
"in the ordinary course of business" and to characterize this as an
administrative expense under § 503(b)(1). 99 Failing this, a debtor may,
after notice and a hearing, obtain financing "secured by a lien on
property of the estate not otherwise subject to a lien," or "secured by a
junior lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien."100 Credit
obtained in this manner has priority over other administrative expenses,
as outlined in § 503(b) and § 507.101
Using § 364, a debtor would extend to a vendor a security interest in
the supplies and accounts receivable purchased with the new credit. A
debtor could also use any other property to secure the credit, so long as it
met the criteria of § 364(c). 10 2 This is an effective solution to the problem
of critical vendor orders since those vendors considering extending credit
to a debtor while also having pre-petition claims will have the assurance
all other claims and,
that these new, secured claims gain priority above
03
thus, have the highest probability of being paid.1
" 11 U.S.C. § 364(a). Another helpful provision is § 546(h) of the Code, which
allows for the return of goods under certain circumstances. For a brief description of this
section's uses, see Peter M. Gilhuly & Geoffrey L. Berman, Section 546(h): An
Unsecured Trade Creditor'sFriend,17 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (1998).
9911 U.S.C. § 364(a).
'0o
§ 364(c)(2)-(3).
10' § 364(c)(1). Section 503(b) lays out the categories of allowed administrative
expense and § 507 sets the priority list that is so integral to the Bankruptcy Code. See

§§ 503(b), 507(b).
102§ 364(c)(1 )-(3), in pertinent part, reads as follows:

If the trustee is unable to obtain unsecured credit allowable under section
503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense, the court, after notice and a
hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt-

(1) with priority over any or all administrative expenses of the kind
specified in section 503(b) or 507(b) of this title;
(2) secured by a lien on property of the estate that is not otherwise
subject to a lien; or
(3) secured by a junior lien on property of the estate that is subject to
a lien.
Id.
103 See generally Lisa S. Gretchko, Seller Beware! Are Your Post-Petition Goods
Deliveries Eligible for Administrative Priority?, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14 (2002)
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Section 364 also persuasively refutes cases like In re Payless
Cashways, Inc., where a debtor sought permission to elevate the prepetition claims of certain lumber vendors to the level of an administrative
expense in exchange for post-petition unsecured credit. °4 The court
allowed payment of pre-petition debts, holding that "the proposed
arrangements are critical to the continued operation of the debtor."' 0 5 In
so holding, the court noted that "where the debtor does not have postpetition financing in place, the bare promise of a priority administrative
expense claim. . . cannot be expected to induce suppliers to extend credit
to a debtor."' 1 6 However, this case involved unsecured credit, not the
proposal here where a creditor would receive a security interest.
Should the debtor secure a line of credit from a bank, for example,
the court could employ the suggestion made by the Seventh Circuit in In
re Kmart;10 7 that is, use of a "standby letter of credit" where the court
would allow unpaid vendors with post-petition claims to receive payment from this pool of money.108 While not exact, In re Ike Kempner &
Bros., Inc. serves to illustrate this concept. 109 The debtor, a shoe retailer
in chapter 11, was the sole retail store selling a line of shoes supplied by
U.S. Shoe Corporation." 0 This line of shoes was a significant source of
profit for Ike Kempner Bros. 1 U.S. Shoe conditioned future shipments
on Ike Kempner paying its pre-petition debts in full, which the court
found to be in violation of the Code."12 The court, apparently influenced
by Ike Kempner's efforts to effectively reorganize," 3 ordered U.S. Shoe
not only to fill pre-petition orders but also to fill future orders:

(discussing steps that vendors can take to increase the likelihood that their post-petition
goods deliveries will be eligible for administrative priority).
'04
05 In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543, 544 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001).
1

id.

'06

Id. at 547.

107 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004).
108 See discussion of in re Kmart supra Part II.A. 1.

109 Ike Kempner & Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Corp. (In re Ike Kempner & Bros., Inc.),
4 B.R. 31 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1980).
" 0 Id. at 32.
"'1 Id.

"12 Id. ("[D]efendant refused to complete orders of plaintiff unless
debts incurred
prior to filing of the Chapter 11 case be paid in full, which is tantamount to harassment
prohibited by Chapter 11.").
"3 "[T]he [debtor] engaged . . . an expert in aiding companies with financial
difficulties, who has made substantial and positive changes in the debtor's operation and
has arranged an accord with practically all of plaintiff's trade creditors except the

defendant herein." Id.
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The defendant should be ordered to fill orders for shoes applied for
prior to filing of this case, conditioned that plaintiff issue its debtor in
possession check prior to shipment unless the parties agree otherwise,
conditioned further that plaintiff be given the usual trade discounts.
The Court further finds that under the unique circumstances of this
case, the defendant should be required to fill future orders upon
assurances of payment and that defendant will be required to accept a
debtor in possession check prior to the shipment of said orders as
adequate assurance of payment unless the parties agree otherwise." 4

This order closely resembles the Seventh Circuit's suggestion of a
standby letter of credit from In re Kmart."' An added wrinkle in In re
Ike Kempner & Bros. was that U.S. Shoe had not fully performed the
pre-petition deal, and the Code allows a trustee (or DIP) to require
fulfillment of such deals." 16
A subsequent case, In re Sportfame of Ohio, Inc.,117 illustrates
another alternative to critical vendor orders. Sportfame, a sporting goods
retailer, sold the Wilson Sporting Goods product line for some years
before filing a bankruptcy petition.'" Prior to Sportfame's filing, Wilson
stopped shipments to the retailer because of nonpayment."19 While in a
chapter 11 reorganization, Sportfame repeatedly requested that Wilson
ship products, offering to pay cash in advance of delivery or to work out
some cash-on-delivery arrangement. 12 Nonetheless, Wilson refused to
make deliveries under any arrangement unless Sportfame paid its
arrearage in full or submitted a plan that would result in payment of all
pre-petition debt owed Wilson.' 21 The court found that Wilson's actions
violated the automatic stay 122 and entered an injunction requiring Wilson
to "ship goods to Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. on its order upon receipt of
cash in advance or upon arrangement for cash on delivery .... ,21
This case also provides a good example of the proper use by a court
of § 105's equitable powers. The opinion noted that Wilson's refusal to
do business with Sportfame on a cash basis "can only be explained by
114 Id. at 32-33.
15See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
16In relIke Kempner & Bros., 4 B.R. at 32.
"7 In re Sportfame of Ohio, Inc., 40 B.R. 47 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
8
" Id. at48.
"1/d. at49.
120 id.
121Id.

122 Id. at 50. (The relevant section of the Code used by the court was 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(6) (2004)).
123 In Re Sportfame, Inc., 40 B.R. 47, 56 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 93

spite or ill-will towards the debtor and its effort to emerge as a
successfully reorganized entity. An injunction in this case pursuant to
section 105(a) of the Code is thus 'necessary or appropriate' to carry out
the provisions of Title 11.,,124
C. Cross-collateralization
While generally disfavored by the courts,1 25 "cross-collateralization"
is another alternative to critical vendor orders, related to granting postpetition security interests. Cross-collateralization "secur[es] a prepetition obligation with new or additional collateral post-petition in
connection with a new post-petition loan."' 126 There are, however,
problems with the use of this alternative.
First, cross-collateralization runs against § 507's priority scheme,
which is a fundamental tenet of the Code. 127 The second criticism poses a
more practical problem. Take, for example, a home improvement retailer
that sells various kinds of lumber. This company finds itself in chapter
11 reorganization and has pre-petition claims from a lumber supplier. In
an effort to keep business going, the debtor company approaches that
same lumber supplier and negotiates a new deal to receive lumber. The
lumber supplier requires that the debtor grant a security interest in its
entire lumber inventory. The result of this arrangement is that the prepetition claim of the lumber supplier, which was likely unsecured or
undersecured, is rolled into the new secured claim and also acquires
secured status, placing it at the top of the bankruptcy code's priority
12
list. 1

This state of affairs arises for two main reasons. First, the vendor has
been burned once and wants to salvage as much of the pre-petition claim
as it can. Second, the logistics of a debtor separating the inventory
acquired pre-petition from that which is acquired post-petition are
24
125

I at 53.
Id.

See, e.g., Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. Inc., 963 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1992)

(holding that cross-collateralization is not authorized under the Bankruptcy Code); In re
Texion, 596 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that a bankruptcy court should not have
granted an ex parte order authorizing cross-collateralization, largely because such a
scheme of financing is contrary to the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act);.
126 ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND

CREDITORS 581 (4th ed. 2001).
127 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2004). For more on the priority scheme, see Gilday, supra note
5. For a discussion of the pros and cons of cross-collateralization, see Henoch, supra

note 51, at 599-601.
128 See discussion supra Part III.B for a description of how this is done via § 364(c)
and § 507(b) of the Code.
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difficult at best. The two inventories are often commingled, and it
becomes nearly impossible to sort them out should the debtor default on
the post-petition deal. 29 If the vendor, however, would be satisfied in
receiving a junior or secondary lien, this approach would become more
feasible, though it is not likely to satisfy the vendor since it would afford
little additional security in most instances.
D. Define "Critical" Strictly
If critical vendor orders are to be retained, their parameters should be
clearly set and their applications circumscribed. 3 As discussed above,
critical vendor orders constitute a radical addition to the Code, signifying
a departure from the Code's basic tenets. Even cases supporting critical
vendor orders recognize the special nature of granting such orders. 3' For
example, in Dudley v. Mealey, Judge Learned Hand employed critical
vendor orders as the exception, not necessarily the rule.'3 2 In addition,
the bankruptcy court in In re Chandlier referred to "extraordinary"
circumstances:
The Doctrine of Necessity is inapplicable. That Doctrine is a rule of
payment that allows trustees to pay pre-petition debts in order to obtain
continued supplies or services essential to a debtor's reorganization. The
Doctrine itself is a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 507 and[,] in fact, is not
authorized by any Bankruptcy Code section. When it has been applied it
allows payment in a Chapter 11 case under very extraordinary
circumstances of a few critical vendors who furnish the debtor 33
with unique
and vital supplies so that the debtor can operate and reorganize.'
129 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 126, at 581-86.
130 See discussion of In re CoServ supra Part II.A.2.
131Gilday, supra note 5, at 432.
132
Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1945); see also Gilday, supra note
5, at 426-27:
In a 1945 decision, Dudley v. Mealey, Judge Learned Hand surmised that
the Six Months Rule could be extended to chapter X reorganization cases other

than those involving railroads. It can be argued, though, that the structure of
chapter X and the case's emphasis on classification within a reorganization
plan make the opinion inapplicable to modem law. Congress codified the Six
Months Rule in section 77(b) of the Bankruptcy Act and then section 1171(b)
of the Code. The Code made clear that the provision is applicable only to cases
involving railroads.
Id.

133In re Chandlier, 292 BR. 583, 588 (Bankr. D. Mich. 2003); see also In re CEI
Roofing Inc., 315 B.R. 50, 55 (Bankr. D. Tex. 2004); In re Just for Feet Inc., 242 B.R.
821, 824 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); In re Revco D.S. Inc., 91 B.R. 777, 780 (Bankr. D. Ohio
1988).
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Thus, defining "critical" should focus on hard economic data and market
analyses rather than on the general sense of a debtor in a tight financial
spot. Merely asserting that a vendor is crucial to a business's survival
should not be enough. 134
If a powerful tool like critical vendor orders is to be used, the test for
its use should be objective, not subjective. The debtor should be required
to show that the vendor either supplies a unique product, is necessary to
avoid debilitating lead times in delivery, or is the only vendor in the
market willing to do business with the debtor, and that it supplies a good
135
or service the debtor absolutely must have to continue operating.
E. Notice
When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, it makes all of its creditors
parties to the suit. As with all other federal suits, a debtor is required to
give notice to those creditors when the petition is filed:
Rule 4(a), (b), (c)(1), (d)(1), (e)-(j), (1), and (in) F.R.Civ.P. applies
in adversary proceedings. Personal service pursuant to Rule 4(e)-()
F.R.Civ.P. may be made by any person at least 18 years of age who is
not a party, and the summons may be delivered by the clerk to any such
person. 136
The Code also mandates that bankruptcy petitions follow Rule 5 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 which states:
Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every order required
by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original
complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served
upon a party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion
other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice,
appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record
3 8 on
appeal, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties.
Thus, the argument could be made that debtors filing critical vendor
motions should be required to notify all affected creditors that such a
supra note 5 and accompanying text for an example.
discussion supra Parts II.A. 1-2 for illustrations.
136 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004.
13' FED. R. BANKR. P. 7005 ("Rule 5 F.R.Civ.P. applies in adversary proceedings.").
13' FED. R. Civ. P. 5(a).
134See
135See
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motion is pending before the court. The fundamental reasons for
demanding this notice need not be repeated here, but they include the
basic arguments taught to all first-year law students and are grounded in
the American judicial system's notions of fairness and equity. 3 9
Critical vendor motions are certainly of great interest to all creditors,
particularly those who may be deemed "not critical." It would seem
unjust to deprive them of the opportunity to protect their interests.14 ° This
was an issue contemplated by the court in In re Kmart,14 1 where concerns
for non-critical vendors were noted. 142 In the past, while consideration of
such orders may have been considered routine and administrative, In re
Kmart, In re CoServ, and many other cases now seem to indicate the
contrary. Critical vendor motions create a textbook "adversarial hearing,"
and it is impossible to have such a hearing without adversaries, which in
this case are the vendors who may be deemed non-critical.

Requiring notice would also help judges by supplying them with a
more comprehensive body of data and affording them more arguments
upon which to base a decision:
Requiring vendors to appear in court likely allows the judge to
more accurately gauge the factors at play. Their direct testimony can be
more instructive than a static affidavit. The added inconvenience and
accountability related to appearing in court may also 1help
vendors
43
reconsider their decision not to cooperate with the debtor.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Critical vendor orders should be eliminated. The only place in the
Bankruptcy Code where their use can be justified is in railroad company
petitions. Yet, Congress has never seen fit to extend doctrines such as the
Necessity of Payment Rule or the Six Months Rule beyond those specific
cases in the hundred-plus years they have been in existence. Even
sections like § 105(a), with its broad grant of equitable authority,
specifically limit exercises of that power to situations mandated by
provisions of the Code.
Employing critical vendor orders and the Doctrine of Necessity
requires judges to cast aside two fundamental tenets of the Bankruptcy
Code: 1) § 507's priority list of creditors, and 2) the automatic stay of
139 See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
140 For a summary of important tips and strategies for unsecured creditors, see Ayer
et. al., supra note 4, at 16.
141In re Kmart, 359 F.3d 866, 869-71 (7th Cir. 2004).
142 See Sprayregen et al., supra note 3 1, at 26.
143Gilday, supra note 5, at 420.
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§ 362, which prohibits "any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under
this title .

.

. ."144 In the end, critical vendor orders benefit unsecured

creditors who knew the risks of non-payment when they extended the
credit. To rewrite or to ignore an extensive federal law like the
Bankruptcy Code because a creditor freely took a chance and now wants
a "do over" is largely indefensible.
Debtors who would benefit from critical vendor orders have only
slightly better legs to stand on in defending such orders. While some
vendors may be very important to a business, the Code provides debtors
with many tools to facilitate reorganization, including some instances in
which debtors can force vendors to deal with them. Cases such as In re
Ike Kempner and In re Sportfame illustrate situations in which a vendor

that has an ongoing business relationship with the debtor can be forced
into post-petition dealings with that debtor. 145 This is accomplished via
the provisions of the Code itself, not by using doctrines that run contrary
to the spirit or letter of the Code.
Problems with fairness to creditors either deemed "not critical" or
who are not given notice that a critical vendor motion is being considered
are other reasons for eliminating critical vendor orders and the Doctrine
of Necessity. At least four circuits have either rejected or severely
limited critical vendor orders, 46 and the effects of the Seventh Circuit

ruling in In re Kmnart continue to persist today. 147
In certain respects, the debate on critical vendor orders reaches to
core philosophical ideas behind the American adjudicative system. First
is the role of judges and whether that role includes the power of judicial
"activism." When faced with a difficult decision regarding whether a
vendor will refuse future dealings with the debtor and scuttle
reorganization if pre-petition claims are not paid, should a judge be able
to take actions not allowed under the law based on equity or on some
similar justification? While there are certainly some instances when laws
should be overturned by courts, bankruptcy does not appear to be one of
these instances. Businesses start and fail in the market every year, yet no
injustice results. Further, critical vendor orders are certainly not a
debtor's sole recourse in implementing an effective plan of reorganization. Many alternatives are available.
One of the primary functions of the Bankruptcy Code is to bring
order and predictability to cases where a business is failing-to stop the
'44

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2004).

145See discussion supra Part II.B.
46See Sprayregen et al., supra note 31, at 26.
47See id.
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scramble by creditors to collect what they can before there is nothing
left. Another purpose is to give creditors notice of what to expect in the
event that a business to which they are contemplating extending credit is
not be able to pay the debt. Those creditors can more effectively evaluate
their risks and benefits if they can accurately predict what will happen
should a debtor file for bankruptcy. Critical vendor orders bring disorder
to this arrangement, and thus have no place in the law.

